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Case No.
11804

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment wherein the plaintiff seeks a determination that Chapter 206,
La-ws of Utah, 1969, (Senate Bill 205) be declared unconstitutional and that defenda-nts be enjoined from the
acts contemplated by the statute. (R. 1-9)
1

DISPOSITIOX IN LO-WER COURT
The trial court held that Chapter 206, Laws of Utah,
1969, was constitutional, and the eomplaint of plaintiff
was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. (R.

73-78)

SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the trial
court determination, and a declaration that Chapter 206,
Laws of Utah, 1969, is unconstitutional in whole or in
part; defendants-respondents urge the affirmance of the
lo·wer court decision, and a declaration that the statute
is constitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants-respondents do not take exception
to the statement of facts of plaintiff-appellant insofar
as it designates and identifies the parties to this litigation, and the constitutional provisions relating to the
office of Treasurer. Exception is taken, however, to the
recitation of the statutory duties of the State Treasurer,
and any inference or claim that acts in pursuance of such
legislation have established a practice or pattern which
bears upon the scope of the constitutional functions of
the Treasurer. Further exception is taken to any claim
that such legislation may be a recognition of some inherent or historical functions of the Treasurer. No evidence was presented in this matter; the lower court determination was a judgment on the pleadings; any alleged acts or practices of the State Treasurer under
2

statutory provisions are irrele,·ant, and in any event not
hl•ton' the court. If the court considers sueh alleged acts
and practices properly lwfore it for consideration it ii"
submitted that, if m1ything, the statutory provisions indieak the legislaturr has not considered the Treasurer
to han' any inherent authority to manage, invest or deposit state funds, hut has enacted legislation covering the

ARGU:\IENT
POINT I
CHAPTER 206, LA "\VS OF UTAH, 1969,
DOES NOT
"WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF THE TREASURER
AS THE CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, known as the
Statr
Management Act, relates to the funds of
the State of Utah and its political subdivisions; it pro,·idcs for a system of centralized investment and managf'ment of those funds; in furtherance of this objective it
creates a division of im·estments, an investment council,
an investment officer and a financial analyst within the
division, defining their various duties; the act, inter
alia, provides for the qualifications of a qualified depository of public funds, and for the more prompt payIllc'11t of state moneys.
The plaintiff-appellant claims that Chapter 206,
Laws of Utah, 1969, contravenes the provisions of Section 17 of Article VII of the Constitution of Utah, which
Jn·o,·ides :
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''The Auditor shall be Auditor of Public ..-\ccounts, and the Tn•asurer shall ht> the eusto<lia 11
of public moneys, and each shall perform such
other duties as may be provided by law.''
It is most appare11t that the only issue raised in this
case turns on the definition of "custodian of puhlir
moneys"; for if the State Money Management Act does
not contravene such constitutional duty of the Treasurer, there cannot be a violation of the Constitution, for
the Treasurer '' * * * shall perform such other duties
as may be provided by law.''

Plaintiff-appellant cites no cases or authority defini11g the phrase, ''custodian of public moneys'' or
"custodian", but asserts without warrant that the constitutional pov,rer of the State Treasurer '' * * * includes
the function of managing, investing, reinvesting and depositing the monies of the State * * * ". (Appellant's
Brief, page 9) The total absence of any authority in
support of this proposition is significant.
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition defines ''custodian'' as follows: ''one who ha:;
care or custody * * * ; a keeper.''
The term "custody" as applied to property is defined in 25 C.J.S., Custody, p. 90, as follows:
''The keeping of property by one who is
charged with or assumes responsibility for its
safety; the care and charge of property for one
who retains the right to control it; the charge
to keep and care for the owner, subject to his
order and direction, without any interest or right
therein adverse to him; such a relation toward it
as would constitute possession if the person having custody had it on his own account.''
4

Set> Natio11al Fire Insurance Co. r. Dai:is, (Texas) 179
S. -w. 2cl :n6; U.S. c. One O:r-5 Amrrican Eagle Airplane,
:l8
JOG.
Aconli11g to 81 C..J.S., States, p. 1191:
'' "' * " The legal title to public moneys in
the hands of th<" state treasurC'r or other officer
C'llt ! t lc<l to cu st otly thereof is in the state and not
i11 sneh officer."

It is apparent that custody, and the role of a custodian, i:rrnlve the care and charge of property for the
owner, always subject to the order and direction of the
o\\·11pr. In th<> case of Territory ex rel. City of Albuquerq111' r. Jlatson (N. Mexico) 113 Pac. 816, the court, among
other questions, had to decide whether under state law
a
had the right to df'signate a depository of money
in the hands of its treasurer. The statute in question pro\'i< led that the treasurer "may be required to keep all
moneys in his hands belonging to the corporation in such
}Jl;1cf' of cll'posit as may be designated by ordinance."
The sta tut<' tllC'n stated: "Provided, however, no such
on linanee shall be passed by which the custody of such
nwm·Y shall be taken from the treasurer." "\Vhether the
foregoing statutory provisions were contradictory was
analyzed by tllC' court as follows:
"It should be borne in mind that the money
is all the time the property of the city and not of
the treasurer; that his duty is to recein it for
the city and with it pay claims against th1> city
\\·hich have been duly approved.
Plse
is, or should be, subsidiary to this main ohject.
I11 that connection, the word "custody" must
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mean immediate cliarge awl eontrol uwler the
law, and not thr final ab1->olutr eontrol of ow 11 Prship. Suppose a pen;on to be earrying on a l1usiness through a manager, nrnl tliat he clir0ds him
to deposit all the money he reeeins in a eertaill
bank in his own name as manager, and subjf·d
only to his rherks a8 manager, could it he said
with any show of reason that the money is not
in his custody because lie did not select the hank
of deposit? And is a prisoner any less in the·
custody of the jailer because he holds him in a
jail provided by the county and designated Jnlaw as the place of confinement for such a
er? If by the ordinance in question the city had,
for instance, required the treasurer to deposit in
the joint names of himself and some other officer
of the city, and that payments from the deposit
should be made only by checks signed by both
such depositors, that obviously would have been
calculated to deprive him of the custody of the
money. But the mere designation of the bank in
which he shall deposit, in his own name, and subject only to his own checks, as treasurer, without
in the least restricting his right to pay out the
money acording to law, is not depriving him of
the custody of the money.''
This court has recognized and upheld the right of
the Utah State Land Board to make investment of certain state funds. S('e State Ho!lrd of La11rl Commissio11ers
L Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59; State Land Boarr1 r.
State Finance Commission, 12 Utah 2d 263, 365 P.2d 21:3.
The result8 of these decisions are in accord with the argument advanced herein by clefenclants-respondents, hut
are contrary to that adYocated by the Treasurer.

6

It is suhrnitt<•<l that th<_ position of thP <ldenclanbi ,·,_;po!ld('llts a11Pnt thL ('Ollstitntional <lntirs of tlw Tn•as111'('1' is a'so i11 aeconl with l('gislation
e11acte<l n'"ardi11g
.
,...
1 ht· deposit, i m·rst me11t, a 11< l managPnwnt of pu hlic
111•1JJ<'ys. I11 this rl'Rprct S('(' Sectio11s :ll-5-1 to :ll-5-13,
L« .. \.
as amended (Fnrnls Consolidation Aet);
:-;('l·tions
t't St'q., P.C.A.
as amPnded (im·esti:w11ts
the Director of
Sedion G3-1-G3, r.c .
. \.
linnstments by Utah State Lan!l Board); Sect im1s ;Jl-1-1 to 31-1-11, F.C.A. 1953, (State Depository
1

1

.\et).

It is submitted that the Treasurer's constitutional
duty as the "custoflian of public moneys" does not inrnl\·p the powers of managing, investing, reinvesting
altd (kpositi11g the moneys of the state as claimed by appPlhrnt. Clearly the definition of "custody" indicates
that the Treasurer has the immediate charge to keep and
(-;t1·c for the pub lie moneys, subject to order and direction
or· t lie· legislature, which has the absolute control. The
duties and functions of the statutory officers set forth
i11 <'haptL>r 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, do not conflict with
t ];(· eu-;todial powers of the Treasurer, aforementioned;
<rnrl the statute thus does not conflict with the Utah
( \n1stitution.
1

7

P< nxre 11

THE OFFICES
BY CHAPTER 206, LA \VS
UTAH, 19GD, AND THE
FUN"CTIOKS THEREOF DO NOT VIOLA'l1E
THE UTAH CONSTI'l'rTION.
Plaintiff-appellant claims Chapkr 20G, Laws of
Utah, 1969, to be unconstitutional because it
for the creation of an investment council; an inwstment officer; a financial analyst; and the creation of
an investment division within the office of the Statp
Treasurer. Certain Utah Constitutional provisions an•
l·itecl for support of this cu11t0lltion, namely: Artiele V,
Section 1, which deals with the respectin departments of
go,·ernment; Article VII, S0ction 1, which enumerates
the offices in the executive department; Article VII,
Section 10, which sets forth the appointive powers vested
in the Governor; and Article VII, Section 17, \d1ich states
that the Treasurer shall be the custodian of publi('
moneys. The argument is that these provisions preclude
the Legislature from either directly making appointments of deputies or other personnel within the offiee of
the Treasurer, or empow<:'ring the Governor or any
other executi,·e officer to make such appointments.
This conclusion advanced is defective, for the Utah
Constitution grants no power of appointment to the
Treasurer, arnl 1wovicles for no constitutional officer
under the control of the Treasurer. The office of the
deputy treasurer is a creation of statute; the authority
for the Treasurer to appoint a deputy is statutory. Section G/-9-1, U.C'.A. 1!););).
deficient an· the

8

;1nd autlioritil's t·itPd
tl1P Tn•nsnrer, whi('h tell us
..;11nw int(•resting things about various mattt'rs, hnt which
;1n· i11appli(·al>ll' to th<' issm•s of tlH• instant <·ast'.
Iu the ease of Ricks i:. Department of State Civil
,...,·1·n-i('I· (La.) 8 So. :2d .HJ, it is stated:
"\\'p ha1·t· lH•<•n 1111al:l1· to find an\· d(•<'ision of
this eonrt passing on the qlwstion of whether or
1101 a t·o11stitutiu11al ot't'i<·t·r has a eo11:-;titntio11al
right to Relect his employpes. However, it has
lir>t•11 h<•ld in otlH·r statt>s tlrnt stnt<• offi<·<•rs haYP
no such constitutional right. The theory upon
which tlwse decisions an• hased is to the> l'ffrct
that the duties of an officer an• those imposc>d by
law, and the employees who assist him are not
his <•mplo:n•es, hut tlw c>mployees of the state>.
'l1he employec>s are in public service and not
prin1k s<'n·ice, and tlw state, aud not thP officer,
Prnploys them and pays them. In otlwr words, the
offieC'r does not have the vesterl or private per:-;011al right to select his suhor<linatl's. PeoplP v .
.\leCnllough, 23-! Ill. 9, 98 N.E. 156, Ann. Cas.
1913B, 905; People v. Loeffler, 175 Ill. 585, 51
N.E. 785; People v. Capp, 61 Colo. 296, 158 P. 143;
St<J\\<' , ..
13;) Or. :111, 2% P. 8G7.''

People u. Capp (Colo.) 158 P.143,
the ques: iqn of ,,·hdlwr the Colorado civil :-;prvicP law re:-;trietl>d
1 JI(• ('(1JJ...;titutional appointive power;; of thl' gon•rnor ii1<1srntwh as tlw law in question eontt•mplakd th(' cPrtifi,·,ition of an C'ligiblc• arnl 1n·osrH:di\·e t•mployc•l' hy the
,.;,·ii s(•n·iet• eommis:-;io11. In ans\\·erillg the assl'rtion that
111 L' d i:-;l'rl'tion of the go\·crnor in making a ppoi 11tm('11t s
\\';1:-:
111

takc·11 a\\·ay, and he was thus deprin·d of his po\n·r

jl('!'t'()1·m eo11stitutio11al duties, the court stated:

"This prnpositio11 is sournl when appli0d to
C'011stitutio11al officers, hut in this ease counspl
fallen into error in their conclusion hccans('
they have failed to Llistinguish betwec>n officer,
proYided by the constitution and officers create;!
by statute. There is no provision in the constitution giving the governor power to appoint the
warden of the reformatory, or that requires the
legislature to confer upon the governor the power
to appoint that officer. The legislature was therefore free to confer that power upon some other
official or board, as it might see fit, and because
it originally conferred the power upon the governor is no reason why that body may not either
qualify that po1Yer, or if so disposed, take it away
entirely. Had the constitution created the office o.f
warden, or had it provided that the governor
should appoint the warden when the legislature
created the office, it may be conceded that then
the governor's discretion could not be interfered
with by the legislature. Hence it is plain that the
statutory provision here assailed in no sense co11tra1-enes the constitutional provision in question."

Stowe v. Ryan (Oregon) 296 P. 857, involved the
right of the civil service commission to terminate a deputy county elerk, under the Oregon law which authorized
such action, and whether the law violated the state constitution. The court held:
''The petitioner discusses at great length the
right of the commission to interfere \Yi th the
countv cle>rk 's office bv removing or appointing
a dc>p.uty county elerk.' Thc> office of the county
clerk is a constitutional office; but that of deputy
countv clerk is strictlv statutorv. If the appointing
pO'.Ye; were expressly given to 'the county
by
tlw Constitution, then in such case the commission
10

\rn1ild lia\·1· 110 right to appoint or dis('harg-e tht'
dP}lllty
dnk."

It ii' thus appan'nt that tht' lPgislature may create
11ffi('<'" awl J)]'o\·ide for tlH·ir mannc>r of appointment,
rc·11:1n>, a11d otht>r ineidc>ntl', md(•ss othPrwise restriete(l
\,,. tl11· ('()J1stitutio11, and in thP instant <·asp 110 sud1 rc>"; r:1i1it ii' indil'ated. The T-tah ( 'onstitution <lops not pro-

rnl·· for tltl' offict·s iu q1wstiun, nor grant authority for
1 !1(· Tn•;1:-;un'r to appoint to such offi('PS. ThNPfore, it
is snhmittecl that the offict>s and orgauizational structnn· sd forth in Chapter 20G, La\YS of Ptah, Hl69, do not
\'Ollt nn-P11e the Constitution of Utah; and it is further
submit kd that the duties incident to these statutory
offi<-es do not confliet with the Treasurer's constitutional
as custodian of the public moneys. (SeP Point I)

TO

POINT III
FNCONSTirrUTIONAL, A STAT-

.\ll1 ST CLEARLY VIOLATE A SPECI-

FIC < 'OXSTITUTTOXAL PROVISION AND
THE VIOLATION .JIUST
t 'LETI•:, AXD
XO srcu

\-IOL1\TIOX TS

it is fundamental that the k'gislativP hody of thr
-,;iltt• has absolute C'Olltrol UYN its final!Cl'S. l'uless
lirnitl·d hY constitutional provisions, tlw power of the
"1<11t> legislature is r1lP1tary a11d it may direct a11d eo111 rnl t lit· disposition of all statt• funds. Sec 81 ( ' ..J.S.,
:-.;Lltl'...,, pag<>s 114:>-1146. As has lwcn stated in th<> ease
t•f Siaf,, r . .llaso11, 94 Vtah 501, 78 P.2<l 920:
''The Legislature has p\·pry power which has
11ot llet'll fully gn111kd to the F(•deral Gon'rnmt•nt
or \\·hieh is not prohihitPd hy State ( '011stitutio11."
11

Similarly in Lehi City
P.2d 530, the court held:

1·.

MeiliJ1.rJ, 87 Utah 237, 48

"It is a truii-;m recognizc><l by all the authorities that the Legislature of a state is vested with
the whole of the legislative pO"wer of the state and
may deal in any subject within the scope of the
constitutional go,-ernment except as such power
is limited or directed by express provision of the
Constitution or necessary implication arising
therefrom. ''State Constitutions are mere
tions, and not grants, of po"-ers.'' Salt Lake Citv
v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah, 38, 95 P. 523, 1'7
L.R.A. (N.S.) 898."
It is submitted that the power of the legislature
over the appropriation and expenditure of public funds
includes as an incident thereof the power over the
management, investment, and deposit of such funds.
Attack having been made on the validity of Chapter
206, Laws of Utah, 1969, any analysis of the assertions
of unconstitutionality can only be pursuant to the guide
lines heretofore set forth hy this Court. Thus in the
Lehi City case, supra, it was stated:
"In approarhing the subject we have in mind
the rule that "·hen an act of the Legislature is
attacked 011 grounds of unconstitutionality the
question presented is not whether it is possible to
condemn the act, but whether it is possible to uphold it. 'l'he presumption is always in favor of
validity, and legislative enactments must be sustained unless clearly in violation of fundamental
law. vVadsworth v. ·Santaquin City, 83 Utah, 321,
28 P.(2<1) 161. Every presumption will be indulged
in fa,·or of legislation and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of pmYer will authorize judicial
12

interference with legislative action. Green v.
Frazier, 25:3 U.S. 2:33, 40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878."
The test of determining whether a statute is invalid
has heeu delineated also in several other Utah decisions,
imluding Trade Commission of Utah i·. Skaggs Drug
Cc11ters, Tue., et al, 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2cl 958, wherein
it was held:
''An alleged violation of the Constitution
mnst he of a specific provision of a particular
article thereof. \Ve have repeatedly held in order
to be dPclared unconstitutional, the statute must
clearly violate some constitutional provision, and
further, the violation must be clear, complete and
unmistakable."

i-.

See also Gubler et al.
Utah State Teacher's Retire111rnt Board et al, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580; Snow v.
K cddi11gton, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234.
The claim of the plaintiff-appellant that Chapter
:206, Laws of Utah, 1969, is unconstitutional, hardly is
supported hy a showing of any violation which is clear,
(·om1Jlete, and unmistakable. To the contrary, the legislation is clearly compatible with the provisions of the
1· tah Constitution.
\Ve adopt in argument the comments of the learned
.Tu(lµ;e of the lower court, who in referring to the Utah
( 'onstitution and the issues invoh·ed in this case, con1·i, 11Jed in part:
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"Under Article VII, Section 3, the only requirements for one to qualify as State Treasurer
are that he be a qualified elector and a resident
citizen of the state for five years next preceding
his election. It also provides that the State Treasurer shall be ineligible to election as his own successor.
Mr. Allen may well be the most competent of
State Treasurers, but to support his position in
this case it would require the court to hold that
as ''custodian of public moneys,'' he, and he
alone, has complete and exclusive control over the
investment and management of funds of the state
and all of its political subdivisions to the exclusion of other public officials and the state legislature, and this even though any State Treasurer
elected to the office may have absolutely no training, ability or experience in the investment and
management of monetary funds and only four
years to learn before he must leave office and
make way for another State Treasurer. I cannot,
in good conscience or judgment, believe that in
using the phrase ''custodian of public moneys,''
the framers of the constitution intended that the
State Treasurer should have such exclusive powers so as to deprive the legislature of any power
to legislate with respect to the wise investment
and handling of millions upon millions of dollars
in public moneys. Certainly, the meaning of the
term ''custodian'' is not so clear and convincing
as to impress this writer that S.B. 205 or any of
its provisions, is clearly, completely and unmistakably unconstitutional." (R. 77-78)

14

CONCLUSION
Defandants-respondents submit that the l\Ioney Management Ad, Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, is constitutional and that the decision and declaration of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond W. Gee
Special Assistant Attorney
General
400 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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